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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The HistoricalandLegal Traditions Underpinning
the Approach of the European Union and the
UnitedStates to Unexpected Employment Termination
Business activities today transcend national borders and continents
affecting the employment status of workers located thousands of miles
from the site of the corporate decision maker. The European Union (E.U.)
and the United States of America, recognizing the potential cost to workers
who lose their jobs, in part, as a result of multinational undertakings, have
enacted legislation to ease the economic impact upon displaced workers.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss2/1
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Some, but not all, Member States within the European Union have
enacted legislation preventing the "unjust" dismissal of employees for
reasons other than the employee's behavior or fault. The United States,
however, has consistently followed the "employment at will" doctrine
authored by legal scholar Horace G. Wood in 1877. The concept had
appeared earlier in the Field Code, which was adopted as part of the
California Civil Code of 1872.2 The doctrine was well described by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in 1884 when it stated as follows: "All
[employers] may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for
good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without being
guilty of a legal wrong." 3
thereby
In recent years, Tennessee's Court of Appeals, Middle Section, has
described the doctrine as the "very foundation of the free enterprise
system."'4 The doctrine is universally accepted in the United States, with
a few limited public policy exceptions.5 Legal commentators in the United
States have argued that the doctrine was a natural response to the War
Between the States (1861-1865) (the Civil War) and the guarantee
contained in the XIII Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that "neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist in the United States." 6 The
rationale was, if employers cannot compel employees to work for them,
then the converse should likewise hold true: one cannot force an employer
to continue employment of a person whose services the employer does not
wish to retain, absent statutory public policy prohibitions..
The difference between the European tradition of "just cause"
termination and the adherence to the "at-will" doctrine in the United States
is manifested in their approaches toward inhibiting and/or minimizing the
economic impact of nonemployee generated dismissal. Given the legal
tradition in many, but not all, European nations of limiting employment
dismissal to "just cause" situations, it is not surprising that the EU would
precede the United States in initiating legislation to lessen the economic
and social impact upon workers subject to collective dismissal.

1. See HORACE GAY WOOD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANT COVERING THE RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND

EMPLOYEES § 134, at 272-73 (2d ed. 1877).
2. CAL. LABOR CODE § 2922 (West 1989); see also Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y. 108

(1854).
3. Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
4. Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
5. See generally Lex K. Larson, UNJUST DISMISSAL Release No. 21, § 10 (1996); Lawrence
E. Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); D. Bruce Shine, The Employment-At-Will
Doctrine - Time to Terminate? But How?,18 TENN. BAR J., Nov. 1982, at 28.
6. F.A. Allen, The Civil War Amendments: XIII-XV, in AN AMERICAN PRIMER (Daniel J.
Boorstin ed., 1985) (quoting to U.S. CONST. Amend. XIII, § 1).
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B. The Motivation of the European Union and the United States
for Softening the Impact of Unexpected Employment Termination
The philosophical foundation for E.U. Council Directive 75/129,'
which relates to Collective Dismissals," lies in part, in the Council's
adoption of the Commission's Social Action Programme of 1974.' The
Treaty of Rome"0 was intended to be a vehicle to "remove all artificial
obstacles to the free movement of labour, goods and capital [that] ...
would in time ensure the optimum allocation of resources throughout the
Community, the optimum rate of economic growth and thus an optimum
social system."" However, economic considerations initially took
precedence over social goals until the Community realized "a true common
market requires that enterprises should compete . . . on equal terms.
Equally ... social costs fall directly or indirectly on enterprises, so that
differences in social systems... [constitute] distortions to competition." 2
As a result, the E.U. Member States concluded that "if the European
Community is to survive, it must have a greater social content than the
original Rome Treaty blueprint envisaged." 3 The two goals, economic
expansion and creation of a social protection system, represent two
divergent approaches 14 to "an open market economy with free

7. An excellent analysis of collective redundancy provisions in 12 of the 15 Member States
as harmonized by Council Directive 75/129 EEC and relevant national legal provisions may be
found in the privately printed monograph, RICHARD FULHAM, COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCIES
PROVISIONS AND PROCEDURES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical
Union (AEEU), 1995).
8. E.E.C. Council Directive 75/129 (98/59) of 17 February 1975 the Approximation of the
Laws of the Member States Relating to Collective Redundancies, 1975 O.J. (L 48/29). On July 20,
1998, the Council adopted Directive 98/59, a codification of Directive 75/129, as amended by
Directive 92/56, 1992 O.J. 16 (L 225, 12/081). The codified and new Directive became effective
20 days after its adoption and publication. The caselaw, articles, etc., that are cited in this article
refer to Directive 75/129 and for the ease of the reader, we shall do so as well with the
understanding that as of August 10, 1998 the proper citation should be Directive 98/59 EEC. Where
the codification has made changes in the numbering of paragraphs within Articles of Directive
75/129 it will be noted by footnote.
9. See Council Resolution of 21 January 1974; Commission on Social Action Programme,
Bulletin of the European Communities, Supp. 2/74.
10. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C224) 1(1992) [1992]
I C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter E.C. Treaty].
11. Michael Shanks, IntroductoryArticle: The SocialPolicyofthe European Communities,
[1977] 14 C.M.L. REV. 375, 375 (1977). Shanks was Director-General for Social Affairs, European
Commission from June 1973 to January 1976.
12. Id. at 376.
13. Id. at 377.
14. See Lord Wedderbum of Charlton, European Community Law and Workers 'Rights: Fact
or Fake in 1992?, 13 DUBLIN U. L. J. 7 (1991).
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competition."' 5 As one writer has noted, the Directive on Collective
Dismissals seeks to utilize the influence of the State over the economic
impact ofjob losses and as such, is geared more to an "employment policy
perspective... than a workers' rights perspective."' 6
The 1975 E.U. Directive had its origin in the "economic liberalism of
the Treaty directed against disparities in the conditions of competition."' 7
The Directive's underpinnings are Article 100 (approximation) and Article
117 (harmonization) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
Clearly, the social goal of Directive 75/129 E.E.C. partially stems from the
Social Action Programme. However, the directive's initial acceptance was
motivated by economic considerations for developing a level playing field
for competitive forces within the European Community.
In 1972, the desire to develop a level playing field within the EU
resulted in a movement towards harmonization of the laws of the EU
Member States that dealt with collective dismissals. The Commission
authorized the development of a report"8 "on legislative provisions
protecting workers in the event of dismissal in the E.E.C. countries,"
which was completed in May 1972.19 The Commission forwarded the
report to the Council in July 1972. Recognizing the disparity among the
then six Member States in protection of displaced workers, the report
focused on social considerations in an effort to develop a level playing
field. This approach was due to "the desirability of some degree of
harmonisation as part of the process of improvement of the living and
working conditions of the labor force. 20
According to M.R. Freedland, Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford,
the "proposals which followed from the Report formed part of the Social
Action Programme set out in the EEC Council Resolution of January 21,
1974 .... ",2 The three year delay between the Report's issuance and the
adoption of Council Directive 75/129 was, in part, a result of opposition
from Great Britain. The United Kingdom opposed a provision within the
proposed Directive that allowed public authorities to postpone or prohibit
dismissals in certain circumstances.22 A crucial compromise was achieved

15. E.C Treaty, supra note 10, art. 3a(l).
16. Mark Freedland, Employment Policy, in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LABOUR LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES 275, 289 (Paul Davies et al. eds., 1996).
17. Lesley Dolding, Collective Redundancies and Community Law, 21 INDJS.L.J. 310, 311
(1992) (quoting B.A. Hepple, Community Measures for the Protection of Workers Against
Dismissal, 14 C.M.L. REV. 489 (1997)).
18. See M.R. Freedland, Employment Protection:Redundancy Proceduresand the EEC, 5
INDUS. L.J. 24, 26 & n.19 (1976) (citing INST. FOR LAB. REL., BULL. No. 4, at 171-203 (1973)).
19. Id.
20. Id. [(1974) O.J. C13/1].
21. Id. n.21 (footnote omitted).
22. See id. at 24-26.
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during a session of the Council of Ministers in late 1974.23 At that time an
agreement was reached whereby Member States were given the option
upon implementation of the Directive to grant or to decline to grant veto
powers over collective dismissals to governmental units charged with
enforcing the Council Directive.24
Parallel activity by the Commission with Council Directive 75/129 may
be found in the Social Action Programme's draft Directive on the
Retention of the Rights of Employees When Mergers, Takeovers and
Amalgamations Occur.25 The draft ultimately found enactment as Council
which is popularly
Directive 77/187, Transfer of Business Directive,
26
Directive.
Rights
"Acquired
the
as
to
referred
The impetus for addressing collective employee dismissals in the
United States was a political reaction generated by organized labor and
Congressional Democrats to corporate takeovers during the 1980s. The
"take-over mania" that swept the United States during that period too often
resulted in sudden plant consolidation, job loss and attendant social
consequences upon workers and their communities. The unenacted LaborManagement Notification and Consultation Act of 1985,27 forerunner to
the legislation ultimately adopted by Congress, was intended to "prevent
unjustified and sudden plant closing by raising the cost of closure to
employers through the elimination of tax write-offs and credits. '28 The
legislation sought to reduce the cost of unemployment benefits
administered by states in addition to providing protection for displaced
employees and their communities.29 It is intriguing the unadopted
legislation used the term "consultation" in its title, a word not previously
used in U.S. labor relations legislative enactments, but exceedingly
familiar in E.U. employment law.
During the 1980s researchers in the United States documented "health
effects [upon workers] caused by stress following plant closures."30 A legal
publication issued within weeks of the enactment of the Workers

23. See id.
24. See E.I.R.R. No. 13 (Jan. 75), at 4-6.
25. See O.J. 1974 (C8/27). This was subsequently adopted as Council Directive 77/187 EEC
of 14 February 1977, on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of
businesses. O.J. 1977 ( L61/27). On 29 June 1998, the Council adopted Directive 98/50 amending
Directive 77/187. The deadline for implementation of legislation by the Member States is July 17,
2001. The date of entry into force of Directive 98/50 was July 17, 1998. O.J. 1998 (L 201).
26. Council Directive 77/187, 1977 O.J. (L61/26).

27.
28.
29.
30.

H.R. REP. No. 99-253 at 815 (1985).
Id. at 815-16.
See id.
Notice Requirements for Plant closings and mass layoffs. 86 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 7

(1988).
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Standard procedure within the I.L.O. requires, before adoption of an
instrument, the subject "come up for discussion at two consecutive annual
Conferences."46 This process was followed, and a first draft was considered
and adopted in June 1981 .4 A revised draft followed, and the proposed
Convention and Recommendation were adopted during the I.L.O.'s 1982
Convention.4 8 "Conventions are designed to influence directly national
legislation and practice in those countries which have ratified them,
Recommendations are conceived of more in the nature of guidelines,
intended to set standards to be achieved over time. 49
Before detailing the provisions of the I.L.O. Convention, it should be
noted the adoption of the Recommendation "was only achieved by a
compromise which took the form of consigning to the Recommendation
some of the more radical (and, to the employers, more objectionable)
proposals first designated for convention status."' Additionally, it should
be observed that the I.L.O. instruments, that is Recommendations and
Conventions, provide no enforceable rights to individuals absent their
adoption and inclusion within national legislation.
Recommendation 119 sets forth the principle that workers should not
be dismissed "unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected
with the capacity or conduct of the workers or based on the operational
requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service."'" This
recommendation is included verbatim in the 1982 Convention.52 The
Convention specifies that union membership, race, color, sex, marital
status, family responsibility, pregnancy, religion, political opinion,
national extraction or social origin, and absences due to maternity leave,
illness, or injury are not valid reasons for termination.53 Lack of union
membership or refusal to join a labor organization is not included on the
Convention's list of unacceptable grounds for termination.54
The 1982 I.L.O. Convention provides for a displaced worker to have
an independent adjudicating tribunal to determine whether the dismissal
wasjustified." The burden of proving that the termination was notjustified

dismissal." Id.
46. Id. at 18.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 19.
52. See C 158 TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONVENTION, 1982, art. 4, reprinted in

International Labour Organization, Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer,
1982 I.L.C. 68 SESSION REPORT No. V [hereinafter 1982 CONVENTION].
53. See id. arts. 5-6.
54. See Napier supra note 41, at 20.
55. See 1982 CONVENTION, supra note 52, art. 9.
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was left to one of two alternatives, or both, to the selection of the
respective national government ratifying the Convention. This procedure
removes "the burden of proving
that the termination was not justified"
56
from the displaced worker.
Those two options allow (1) for placing "the burden of proving the
existence of a valid reason for the termination ...on the employer""
and/or (2) places with the independent tribunal the task of reaching "a
conclusion on the reason for the termination having regard to the evidence
...
and according to the procedures provided for by national law and
practice . . 58
The 1982 I.L.O. Termination of Employment Convention mandates
that a terminated worker "shall be entitled to a reasonable period of notice
or compensation in lieu thereof. . . . ,9 This practice is followed in
WARN. The notice or compensation provision in the I.L.O. Convention
is not required where a worker is guilty of such serious misconduct that his
or her continued presence during the notice period would be
"unreasonable." '
Under the I.L.O. Convention, notification to competent public
authorities of terminations "for reasons of an economic, technological,
structural or similar nature" 6' shall occur "before carrying out the
terminations ....
62 The form and nature of the notice, as well as the
period of time in which termination can occur after notice, are to "be
specified by national laws or regulations. 63
Lastly, consultation with "workers representatives concerned in good
time... [providing] reasons for the terminations contemplated, the number
and categories of workers likely to be affected and the period over which
the terminations"' are to occur. All of which shall take place "in
' The I.L.O. Convention,
accordance with national law and practice."65
unlike the E.U. Directive and the WARN Act, contemplates reinstatement
as a remedy for unjustified dismissal,66 coupled with a form of due process
prior to termination.67 Worker allowances and benefits associated with

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. art. 9.2.
Id. art. 9.2(a).
Id. art. 9.2(b).
Id. art. It.
See id.
Id. art. 14.1.
Id. art. 14.3.
Id.
Id. art. 13.1(a).
Id. art. 13.1(b).
See id. art. 10.
See id. art. 7.
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termination are also contemplated.68
The 1982 Convention and its forerunner, R. 119 Termination of
Employment Recommendation, appear to have served as the legislative
and structural "shell" for the EU Council Directive 75/129 and the WARN
Act of 1988. Since 1919 the I.L.O. has adopted 181 conventions, which are
international treaties requiring national ratification. However, the U.S.
Congress has only ratified twelve of them. Two of these were "shelved"
by the I.L.O., but ten are currently in force. 69 The 1982 Termination of
Employment Convention has not been ratified by the United States.
II. A STRUCTURAL COMPARISON OF E.U. DIRECTIVE 75/129,
AS AMENDED, AND THE U.S. WORKERS ADJUSTMENT AND

RETRAINING NOTIFICATION (WARN)

ACT OF THE UNITED STATES

A. The Differing Approaches in Legislative Structure
Council Directives are not precise legislative enactments covering
every potential factual and legal circumstance. The Member States are the
legal forums in the EU where t's are crossed and i's are dotted by laws,
regulations or administrative provisions. In the United States, the opposite
is the case; Federal legislation is often detailed and precise. The WARN
Act is an exception. The WARN Act consists of nine sections which cover
a mere four pages, including historical and statutory notes as published in
a leading statutory reference manual utilized daily by U.S. labor law
practitioners.70
More representative of congressional enactments that have a single or
limited purpose is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1974,"'
which covers twenty-five pages in the above mentioned reference work.72
A more expansive piece of legislation with a single purpose but having
multiple enforcement and implementation structures built into the
legislative scheme is the Vocational Rehabilitation and Other
Rehabilitation Services Act of 1973. 73 This Act covers 162 pages,
including historical and statutory notes.74
The legal "doctrine of federal preemption" is firmly grounded in the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution and places in Congress the

68. See id. art. 12.1(a). This subject will not be addressed here since it is outside the scope
of this discussion on collective dismissals.
69. See Telephone interview with James Tisdale, Information Officer, I.L.O., (Oct. 8, 1998).
70. See FEDERAL LABOR LAWS 880-83 (20th ed., West Group, 1998).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (West 1994).
72. Id.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 701.
74. Id.
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"power... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States. ' 75 Generally, congressional enactment in an area of
interstate commerce preempts the "several States" from enacting
legislation covering the same topic absent express statutory delegation of
authority to the states. The magnitude of the scope of federal preemption
is found, for example, in the congressional findings and declaration of
policy of the Employee Income Retirement Security Act of 1974
(ERISA).76 This Act preempts states from enacting legislation in the area
of pension and welfare (employee benefit) plans. ERISA mandates that
federal district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions
involving the statute," and the legislation supersedes all claims asserted
under state law over congressionally defined employee benefit plans.
B. The JurisdictionalParameters
Directive 75/129 defines "collective redundancies" as "dismissals
effected by an employer for one or more reasons not related to the
individual workers concerned[.]""8 In the United States, redundancies are
divided into two
categories: those severed from their employment by a
"plant closing"'79 and those whose employment has been lost due to "mass
layoffs."' Under the WARN Act, the jurisdictional distinction grounding
these two forms of employment loss are defined in the following manner:
(1) the term "employer" means any business enterprise that
employs(A) 100 or more employees, excluding part-time
employees; or
(B) 100 or more employees who in the aggregate work at
least 4,000 hours per week (exclusive of hours of overtime);
(2) the term "plant closing" means the permanent or
temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or
more facilities or operating units within a single site of
employment, if the shutdown results in an employment loss
at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for
50 or more employees excluding any part-time employees;
(3) the term "mass layoff' means a reduction in force
which-

75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also id. U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that "powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people").
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (West 1994).
77. See id. § 1132(e).
78. E.U. Directive 75/129, supra note 8, art. 1.1(a).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2) (West 1994).
80. Id. § 2101(a)(3).
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Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act on July 13, 1988, 31
noted:
Social Service agencies have documented alarming increases
in child abuse and spouse abuse occurring after plant closings
and mass layoffs. Where the resulting unemployment lasts for
an extended period of time, the frequency of desertion and
divorce also increase dramatically. .

.

. A recent survey

conducted by the General Accounting Office showed that the
average length of notice provided to blue collar workers was
only seven days. Nonunion firms, on the average, gave their
blue collar workers only two days notice. In addition, onethird of all businesses shut down without any warning at all.
The same GAO study provided solid evidence showing that
this behavior was not necessarily compelled by economic
reasons. Accordingly, only about eight percent of those firms
with 100 or more workers that closed or had a permanent
layoff went bankrupt or filed for financial reorganization
around the time of dislocation.32
Within this context, the WARN Act was adopted in "response to
Congressional findings that ... plant closings and mass layoffs [were] a

problem of national concern."33 The WARN Act passed the U.S. Senate on
July 6, 1988 by a vote of 72 to 23, with opposition from such well known
Republican conservatives as Jesse Helms (R-NC), Phil Gramm (R-TX),
and Strom Thurmond (R-SC). 34 Not one Democratic Senator voted against
WARN, while numerous moderate Republicans "crossed the aisle" to join
the then Democratic majority to achieve enactment.35
The E.U. Collective Dismissal Directive, while it was not
acknowledged as a model for consideration by the U.S. Congress, did
impose its shadow upon WARN's structure. Directive 75/129 has as its
primary goal "avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number of
workers affected .... "36 Secondarily, the Directive mandates that notice
of potential job loss be given to the effected workers,37 consultation with
workers representatives on the impact of suchjob loss be conducted,3" and
notification be given to public authorities in the area in which the job loss

31. 29 U.S.C. 2101.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See 134 CONG. REC. S8868-69 (July 6, 1988).

35. See id.
36. E.U. Directive 75/129, supra note 8, art. 2.2.

37. See id. art. 2(3).
38. See id.
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might occur.39 As with the E.U. Directive, the WARN Act requires notice
be given to public authorities. The underpinnings for these two pieces of
collective dismissal legislation lies in the cultural, political, and
employment traditions of each jurisdiction.
C. The InternationalLabour Organization'sContribution
to Softening the Impact of Unexpected Employment
Termination in the European Union and the United States
Having noted the divergent motivations of the United States and the
European Union for alleviating social and economic problems arising from
collective redundancies, one should not overlook the participation by both
the United States and the Member States of the European Union in the
U.N.-sponsored International Labour Organization (I.L.O.). The I.L.O.'s
interest in non-employee instituted employment loss predates Council
Directive 75/129 E.E.C. The I.L.O., established in 1919, is based on the
belief that "labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article
of commerce. 4 In 1963, the I.L.O. adopted R. 119, the Recommendation
on Termination of Employment "expressed the core principle that
termination of the employment relationship by the employer should not
occur without good and sufficient cause .... ,,'
The I.L.O.'s adoption of R. 119 Termination of Employment
Recommendation in 1963 and its impact upon future international
standards and legislation in this area has been described as "relatively
insignificant" by legal scholar Brian Bercusson, Faculty of Law,
University of Manchester.42 This writer disagrees, not withstanding the fact
the International Labour Organization's Recommendations "do not have
the binding force of I.L.O. Conventions and are not subject to ratification"
by the Member States within the I.L.O.43
In 1979, the I.L.O.'s gover'ning body determined that its 1963
Recommendation deserved priority, promotion, revision, and then revisited
the issue.44 As a result, termination of employment "at the initiative of the
employer"45 was placed on the agenda of the 1981 I.L.O. Conference.

39. See id. art. 4.
40. Treaty of Peace, Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June
28, 1919, Versailles, art. 247, 1919 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 4 (Cmd. 153) [hereinafter Treaty of
Versailles].
41. Brian Napier, Dismissals-TheNew LL.O. Standards, 12 INDUS. L.J. 17(1983).
42. Brian Bercusson, The Conceptualizationof EuropeanLabour Law, 24 INDUS. L.J. 3, 6
(1995).
43. International Labour Organization, database on International Labour Standards, ILOLEX
(visited Oct. 8, 1998) <http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567>.
44. Napier, supra note 41. at 17-18.
45. Id. As Napier notes, "a convoluted way of describing what is, to all intents and purposes,
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(A) is not the result of a plant closing; and
(B) results in an employment loss at the single site of
employment during any 30-day period for
(i) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any
part-time employee(s); and
(ii) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time
employees); or
(iii) at least 100 employees (excluding any part-time
employees)... 81
Regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (D.O.L.) pursuant
to WARN's explicit delegation of authority82 have concluded that some
"mass layoff' situations will meet the "plant closing" definition thereby
83
bringing into play a sixty-day notice requirement.
Under Directive 75/129 EEC, a collective redundancy within the EU
means "dismissals effected by an employer not related to the individual
workers concerned" and which fall into one of two settings, to-wit:
(i) over a period of 30 days:
* at least 10 redundancies in establishments normally
employing more than 20 and less than 100 workers
* at least 10% of the number of workers in
establishments normally employing at least 100 but
less than 300 workers
a at least 30 in establishments normally employing 300
workers or more;
OR
(ii)
over a period of 90 days:
* at least 20, irrespective of the number of workers
normally employed in the-establishments in question."
The Member States may choose which of the above two schemes
employed to implement the Directive's coverage. 5 Additionally, multiple
terminations of individual workers subject to "an employment contract"
are covered by the Directive "provided there are at least five
redundancies." 86 Both legislative enactments contain exclusions from its
coverage. The Council Directive does not apply to:

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. § 2101(a)-(b).
See id. § 2107(a).
See 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(b)-(c); 29 U.S.C. 2102(a).
E.U. Directive 75/129, supra note 8, art. 1.1(a).
Id.
Id. art. 1.1(b).
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(a) collective redundancies affected under contracts of
employment concluded for limited periods of time or for
specific tasks except where such redundancies take place
prior to the date of expiry or the completion of such contracts;
(b) workers employed by public administrative bodies or by
establishments governed by public law (or, in Member States
where this concept is unknown, by equivalent bodies);
(c) the crews of sea-going vessels.... . 7
The WARN Act exclusions are found in the legislation's definition of
an employer in the terms of plant closing and mass layoff; separations not
expressly covered by the statutory definitions are therefore excluded. An
"employment loss" is initiated by a statutorily defined employer and
occurs when "employment termination, other than discharge for cause,
voluntary departure or retirement[,] a lay off exceeding 6 months or a
reduction in hours of work of more than 50 percent during each month of
any 6 month period."88
Part-time employees are not counted for determining coverage under
WARN if a worker averages "fewer than 20 hours per week or [has] been
employed for fewer than 6 of the 12 months preceding the date on which
notice is required."8 9 A part-time employee is, however, entitled to notice
under WARN due to his or her status as an "affected employee."9°
Conversely, as noted by E.U. legal scholar Catherine Barnard "since no
qualification [by the E.U. Directive] is imposed on the definition of a
worker, it must be assumed that Member States cannot exclude, for
example part-time workers from being counted when calculating the
number of workers who are to be made redundant." 9 ' In the European
Union, as in the United States, part-time workers are included as persons
subject to coverage under the notice requirement ofthe Directive. Both the
E.U. Directive and WARN utilize the term "affected employees" and
define such workers as "employees who may reasonably be expected to
experience an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed plant
closing or mass layoff by their employer." 2 The E.U. Directive, however,
uses the term "affected" only once and then merely to detail the Directive's
primary goal to "avoid collective redundancies or reducing the number of
workers affected."93 Each statute, however, possesses the same intent.
Coverage of employees entitled to notice under WARN has been

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. art. 1.2(a)-(c).

29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6) (West 1994).
Id. § 2101(a)(8); id. § 2101(a)(5); see also id. § 2104(a)(7).
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(7).
91. CATHERINE BARNARD, E.C. EMPLOYMENT LAW 389 (1996).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5).
93. E.U. Directive 75/129, supra note 8, art. 2.2.
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expanded by judicial decision and regulations issued by the U.S. D.O.L.
Seasonal employees hired on a recurrent basis who do not qualify as parttime94 are included in the coverage umbrella."' Additionally, workers on
temporary layoff or on leave and who have a reasonable expectation of
recall are counted as affected employees.96 In deciding if an employee has
a reasonable expectation of recall federal district courts in the United
States utilize the five-point criteria97 developed by the National Labor
Relations Board to determine whether laid off employees have the right to
vote on union representation at their place of employment under the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947.98 Indeed, an employee on lay-off in
excess of the six-month limitation contained in WARN9 under certain
circumstances could suffer an "employment loss" and be considered an
"employee" under a statutorily defined plant closing. 11 This will normally
occur where the worker's layoff has been extended beyond the original six
months.'0 '
As noted earlier, in defining collective redundancies within the
European Union, Member States possess two options for determining
whether the Directive and its requirements shall come into play. An option
exists under WARN, not as an alternative for the exercise of the Act's
jurisdiction over collective dismissals but as an additional mode whereby
jurisdiction will attach to an event.
Under WARN, employment losses for two or more groups of
employees at a single site employing less than 100 may be added together
to determine whether a mass layoff or plant closing has occurred.0 2
Aggregation of smaller employment losses will occur where (1) each
group has fewer than the statutory number of affected employees, (2) the
employment loss will occur for each group within 90 days, and (3) the total
number of affected employees exceed those required for jurisdiction to
attach for a plant closing or mass layoff. 0 3 However, WARN will not
apply if "the employer demonstrates that the employment losses are the
result of separate and distinct actions and causes and are not an attempt by

94. See 29 CFR § 639.3 (1998).
95. See generally Kalwagtis v. Preferred Meal Sys., 78 F. 3d 117 (3rd Cir. 1996); Marques
v. Telles Ranch, 867 F. Supp. 1438 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Washington v. Aircap Indus. Corp., 831 F.
Supp. 1292 (D.S.C. 1993).
96. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a).
97. See Damron v. Rob Fork Mining Corp., 739 F. Supp. 341,344-345 (E.D. Ky. 1990), affd
945 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1991)for relevant judicial discussion.
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 141 (West 1994).
99. See id. § 2101(a)(6)(B).
100. Kildea v. Electro Wire, 792 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
101. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(c).
102. See id. § 2102 (d).
103. See id.
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the employer to evade" the Act's coverage."'° This latter provision has
been the subject of litigation with a mixed result by trade unions in the
United States.'05
Directive 75/129 covers forms of termination other than mass layoffs
and plant closings, such as early retirement inducements, provided the
reason for such redundancy is not related to conduct of the individual
worker.'06 Under WARN, coverage can attach when a worker experiences
a "constructive discharge."'' 0 Constructive discharges have been found to
exist where an employer has created a hostile or intolerable work
environment or instituted practices calculated to force an employee to quit
or resign.0 8 Cases litigated in the United States have included situations
where employers have created a hostile work environment through unduly
pressuring workers into accepting employer-driven separation programs,'0 9
and/or offering continued employment by conditioning the offer to reduced
terms and conditions of employment previously rejected. 0
C. The Notification Requirements
Notification to affected employees whose collective redundancy is
"contemplated" within the European Union or "who may be reasonably
expected to experience an employment loss"' in the United States is a
crucial element in each jurisdiction's scheme. As noted earlier, a key
distinction lies in the fact that within the E.U., the employer provides
notification prior to concluding who will be terminated and when, so that
consultation may occur thereafter with worker representatives. In the
United States, notification occurs after the employer-driven decision has
been made, and no consultation takes place with workers or their
representatives absent non-WARN legislative mandate. The divergent
motivations of these two legislative schemes are demonstrated by the way
each enactment addresses the issue of notification to workers and their

104. Id.
105. See generallyUnited Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Alden Corrugated Container Corp., 901
F. Supp. 426 (D. Mass. 1995); OCAW v. American Home Prod., 790 F. Supp. 1441 (N.D. Ind.
1992); UAW Local 1077 v. Shadyside Stamping, 6 IER Cases 1640 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd 947 F.2d
946 (6th Cir. 1991).
106. Colin Bourn, Amending the Collective DismissalsDireciive:A Case of Re-arrangingthe
Deckchairs?,9 Int'l J. of Comp. Lab. L. Indus. Rel. 227, 234 (1993).
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6).
108. See id. § 2101(a)(6).
109. See generally Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 790 F. Supp. 663 (E.D.
La.), order amended, 7 IER Cases 799 (E.D. La. 1992), aff'd. in part,rev 'd in part 15 F.3d 1275
(5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 933 (1995).
110. See Auerbach v. Financial News Network/NBC Cable, C.A. #92-CIV-2553 (E.D. N.Y.
1992).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5) (West 1994).
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communities.
Notification under E.U. Directive 75/129 takes place earlier than
notification under WARN. WARN assumes, absent some unforeseen
circumstance, the redundancies will occur as projected by the employer.
The Directive, however, seeks through notification a means by which
dismissals might be reduced or averted. Nowhere within WARN's text is
it mentioned that employer-projected redundancies might be averted by
employee input. The debates in the U.S. Senate during consideration of
WARN reflect as a "given" the right of employers to unilaterally close
their doors and terminate their employees. The Directive's goal of reducing
collective dismissals by means of information and consultation with
worker representatives and their communities was specifically rejected by
U.S. Senator Steven D. Symms (R. Idaho) during the debate over WARN's
enactment. Senator Symms stated as follows:
European employers, in recent surveys, believe strongly that
one of the major factors contributing to their inability to
remain competitive and thereby create enough jobs to keep up
with the population growth is the limitations imposed by the
labor market rigidities ....
The message that comes from the Europeans... is that they
need to get out from under this type of legislation. Instead of
passing more of it, 2they are saying that they have to rid
themselves from it."1
The primary sponsor of WARN in the Senate was Howard
Metzenbaum (D-Ohio). A liberal Democrat, Senator Metzenbaum put the
issue in perspective when he stated that "[i]t was never the intent of the
author of the Legislation and the supporters of the Legislation to give
Federal courts any authority to enjoin a plant closing or mass layoff...
[W]e are prepared to accept the amendment."' 3 The amendment addressed
by Senator Metzenbaum's remarks appears in WARN as: "Under this
chapter, a Federal court shall not have authority to enjoin a plant closing
or mass layoff.""' 4 Under WARN, the decision to terminate employment
lies exclusively with the employer.
Council Directive 75/129, in discussing the powers bestowed upon
competent public authorities to extend or reduce the time frame in which
redundancies may occur, provides that "Member States may grant the

112. 134 Cong. Rec. 58470 (daily ed. June 23, 1998) (Statements of Sen. Symms).
113. 134 Cong. Rec. 58611 (daily ed. June 27, 1998) (Statements of Sen. Metzenbaum).
114. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(b) (West 1994).
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competent public authority wider powers of extension.""' 5 Extensions by
a competent public authority within the European Union to enlarge or
enjoin a scheduled date for the collective dismissals must, however, be
given to the employer prior to the expiration date for which notification
has been provided.
Although the notification process contained within each piece of
legislation is similar, significant differences exist. Not only does Directive
75/129 mandate worker consultation, which WARN does not, but the
Directive also envisages that consultation with worker representatives1 will
6
be conducted in good time "with a view to reaching an agreement."'
In the United States, prior to enactment of WARN, employers with
collective bargaining agreements with trade unions could lawfully close
117
their entire business for any reason, including anti-union motivation.
Employers were required, however, to negotiate with their employees'
trade unions over the "effects" of plant closings and mass layoffs. "' While
consultation under Directive 75/129 to occur with "a view to reaching an
agreement," such collective bargaining/consultation need not result in an
agreement between the parties in either jurisdiction. The requirement of
U.S. employers to engage in such negotiation if their employees are
represented by a trade union flows from the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, as amended," 9 and remains undisturbed by WARN. The ongoing nature of the obligation to bargain over the effects of plant closings
or mass layoffs is specifically recognized by WARN. 20
D. Notification to Workers and Their Representatives
upon Unexpected Employment Termination
The European Union seeks through Directive 75/129 not only to avert
redundancies, but actively encourages workers representatives to "make
constructive proposals"'' to prevent the projected terminations. Also,
consultation within the European Union contemplates negotiations on aid
for redeploying or retraining workers made redundant.'22 Additionally,
E.U. Member States may provide in their respective national legislation for
worker representatives to call upon the services of experts to advise them
in the information and consultation process.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

E.U. Directive 75/129, supra note 8, art. 4.3 (found in Directive 98/59, art. 4.3).
Id. art. 2.1.
See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-682 (1981).
See 29 U.S.C. § 141.
See id. § 2105.
E.U. Directive 75/129, supra note 8, art. 2.3.
See id. art. 2.2.
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In order to implement consultation within the European Community,
employers shall provide, in writing, to their workers' representatives the
following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The reasons for the projected redundancies;
The number of categories of workers to be made redundant;
The number and categories of workers normally employed;
The period over which the projected redundancies are to be
effected;
5. The criteria proposed for the selection of workers to be made
redundant in so far as national legislation and/or practice confers the
power therefore upon the employer;
6. The method for calculating any redundancy payments 1other
than
23 those arising out of national legislation and/or practice.
On the other hand, WARN merely provides that an employer "shall not
order a plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a 60-day period after
the employer serves written notice" to the labor organization representing
the affected employees. 124 If no labor organization represents the
employees, individual notice must be given within the same time frame to
each affected employee by mailing the notice to an employee's last known
25
address or by inclusion of the notice "in the employee's pay check."'
The D.O.L. has promulgated regulations pursuant to WARN on what
must be included within the written notice mandated by the statute. 26 The
content of the notification varies depending upon whether the affected
worker is represented by a trade union or without representation. For those
enjoying union representation the employer must provide the trade union,
on behalf of its membership, the following:
" Name and address of the employment site.
• Name and telephone number of a company official to
contact for further information.
" Whether planned action is expected to be permanent or
temporary, and whether the entire plant is expected to be
closed. The [D.O.L.] suggests that if the action is expected
to be temporary the expected duration should be stated.
• The anticipated schedule for the separations with dates
stated to the closest 14-day period.
• Job titles of positions to be affected, and names of the
incumbents.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. art. 2.3.
29 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
Id. § 2107(b).
See id § 2107(a).
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• It is also suggested that notice containing helpful
information2 7 such as available dislocated worker
assistance.

For workers unrepresented by a trade union the statutory notice to each
affected employee shall contain the following:
* Name and telephone number of a company official to
contact for further information.
* Whether the planned action is expected to be permanent
or temporary, and whether the entire plant is expected to
be closed. The DOL suggests that if the action is expected
to be temporary, the expected duration should be stated.
" The expected date when the plant closing or mass layoff
will begin; and the expected date, within the closest 14day period, when the individual employee will be
separated.
" An indication of whether or not bumping rights exist.
" The DOL also suggests that notice contain helpful
information28 such as available dislocated worker
assistance.1

In Directive 75/129, three significant items of information must be
provided to worker representatives for employees made redundant within
the European Union. The latter two items exist by reason of the
amendment to Directive 75/129, that is Council Directive 92/56 EEC.
Comparable mandatory information does not require WARN as does the
EU which mandates the employer to provide employees: the reasons .for
the projected redundancies; the criteria proposed for the selection of
workers to be made redundant and or the method for calculating any
redundancy payments other than those arising out of national legislation
and/or practice.
The closest requirement under WARN to those listed above is the
requirement that employees who are unrepresented by a trade union must
be advised whether they possess "bumping rights" to move into jobs not
being made redundant.'29 It is assumed that employees in the United States
working under a collective bargaining agreement-are aware of such rights
or their union will advise them of their options.
Before going to the requirement existing in both schemes for providing
notice to competent public authorities, the issue of consultation for EU
employees unrepresented by a trade union should be briefly addressed.

127. 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(c).
128. Id. § 639.7(d).
129. Id.
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E. Worker Consultationand Information Under EU Directive 75/129
Under Directive 75/129, "'workers' representatives' means the
workers' representatives provided for by the laws or practices of the
Member States."' 3 ° Immediately prior to the Council's adoption of
Directive 92/56, the amendment to Directive 75/129, one legal scholar
wrote as follows:
[T]he Commission expressed concern about the consequences
of having left the definition of "workers representatives" to
the Member States in the original Directive. Of the [then] 12
Member States only Britain, Ireland and Denmark have no
legislation compelling recognition of workers' representatives
for information and consultation purposes, and in Denmark
the matter is covered by collective agreement.' 3 '
As observed earlier, two years after the adoption of the Collective
Dismissals Directive, the Council adopted the Acquired Rights Directive
77/187 EEC,'32 which has application when mergers, takeovers, and
amalgamations of undertakings occur. Without delving into all the specific
provisions covered by the Acquired Rights Directive, suffice it to note one
requirement common to the Collective Dismissals Directive is that
information and consultation between employers and their workers'
representatives occur. The consultation contemplated by Directive 77/187
covers (1) reasons for the transfer; (2) legal, economic, and social
implications33of the transfer; and (3) measures envisaged in relation to the
employees.

Additionally, the seller/transferor will provide such information "in
good time before the transfer is carried out."' 34 If changes in the workers
terms and conditions of employment are contemplated, the parties as
provided for in Directive 75/129, shall consult "in good time on such
measures with a view to seeking agreement."' 35
Further, as with Directive 75/129, the Acquired Rights Directive
provides that "representatives ofthe employees' means the representatives
of the employees provided for by the laws or practices of the Member
States."' 36 Thus, in those Member States where no provision existed in

130.,
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

E.U. Directive 75/129, supra note 8, art. 1(b).
Bourn, supra note 106, at 237.
Directive 77/187, supra note 22 (now titled Directive 98/50 E.E.C.).
Id. § II, art. 6.1.
Id.
Id. § III, art. 6.2.
Id. § 1, art. I(b).
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their national laws for the designation of employee/worker representatives,
primarily the United Kingdom and Ireland, it could be argued that the
social dimension of both Directives was "whittled away in workers' minds
until it [was] a mere illusion."' 37
Prior to the adoption of Council Directive 75/129, the European Union
entertained worker participation with management in a variety of proposals
including, but not limited to, employee membership or representation on
the boards of undertakings. 3 ' The initial legislative proposal for worker
participation was the statute of a European Company (Societas Europaea
or S.E.). 1
Two years later in 1972, the Fifth Directive on the structure of public
companies was announced by the Commission. 4 ' It was intended to
compliment the S.E. and its four models of corporate governance.
However by 1980, the Commission concluded the proposed Fifth Directive
lacked acceptance, in no small measure due to the Directive's requirement
of mandatory employee participation in corporate governance. The
Commission continued their efforts to achieve employee participation 141
in
Directive"'
"Verdling
the
with
consultation
and
information
undertaking
and later the "Richard" proposal of 1983.142 These efforts concluded, in
part, with the European Works Council (EWC) proposal, a scheme to
provide an alternative mode of worker consultation, contained in Directive
94/45 EEC. 143 The E.W.C. scheme was an outgrowth of the Maastricht
Summit of 1992 and its Social Agreement, an agreement opposed most
strenuously by the government of the United Kingdom, and from which it
"opted-out."

137. Bourn, supra note 106, at 230 (footnote omitted).
138. See C.W. Kolvenbach, EEC Company Law, Harmonisationand Worker Participation,
1990 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 709, 765-766.
139. See Manfred Weiss, The European Community's Approach to Worker's Participation,
in DEVELOPING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION INAN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 107 (A.L. Neal & S.
Foyn, Eds. 1995).
140. See 1972 O.J. (C131) 49.
141. See 1980 O.J. (C297) 3.
142. See 1983 O.J. (C217) 3. European Union social affairs ministers have tried unsuccessfully
as recently as November 1998, to break the two decade plus deadlock over enactment of a panEuropean companies statute. A compromise seems unlikely due to the fact "member states are keen
to preserve their own models of worker participation, but Germany's unwillingness to compromise
its tradition of including trade union representatives on management boards is the greatest obstacle
to an accord." Company Statute Plan Still Blocked, EUROPEAN VOICE, Oct. 22-28, 1998, at 4.
Efforts will continue, however, as one unidentified E.U. social affairs minister noted: "It is a slow
process of approximating towards a deal, but we are not quite there yet." Id.
143. See Council Directive 94/45 EEC of 22 September 1994 On the Establishment of a
European Works Council or a Procedure in Community-Scale Undertakings and Community-Scale
Groups of Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and Consulting Employees, 1994 O.J. (L
254) 64.
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Enacting legislation to implement the EU mandate on informing and
consulting employee representatives on transfers and collective
redundancies took a long time to resolve in the United Kingdom. U.K.
legislation providing worker consultation on collective redundancies
originally existed, was subsequently repealed by the Thatcher government
and ultimately included in the Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Consolidation) Act of 1992, and as to transfers in the Transfer of
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (TUPE). "In
both [pieces of legislation], the right to be consulted was originally limited
to [employer] recognised trade unions."'" As a result of the limitation on
consultation to employer recognized unions, the Commission filed
infringement proceedings against the United Kingdom in 1989. These were
concluded in 1994 with two
cases discussed in a single opinion by the
45
European Court of Justice. 1
Italy, however, often cited for its consistent failure to timely implement
E.U. directives, outdid the United Kingdom by fully implementing
Directive 75/129 in 1991.146 The United Kingdom's extended posture as
a "scofflaw" in terms of implementing consultation for its unrepresented
workers can only be deemed, in a perverse sense, impressive. Thus, while
structured worker consultation remained a bedrock
of E.U. policy this right
47
was a mere illusion in the United Kingdom.
F. Notification to PublicAuthorities
Directive 75/129 requires notification to "the competent public
authority in writing of any projected collective redundancies.""' The
notification is to include information required for workers' representatives,
"particularly the reasons for the redundancies, the number of workers to be
made redundant, the number of workers normally employed and the period
over which the redundancies are to be effected."' 49 Thereafter, "workers

144. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS DIRECTORATE, U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, URN
97/988, EMPLOYEES' INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION RIGHTS ON TRANSFERS OF UNDERTAKINGS
AND COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCIES (FEB. 1998) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCIES REPORT].

145. See Cases C-382/92 (Business Transfers) and C-383/92 (Collective Redundancies), E.C.
Commission v. United Kingdom, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 345 (1994) [hereinafter Case C-382/92 and
Case C-383/92, 'respectively].
146. See Bourn, supra note 106, at 235 n.3 1.Italy was subject to two actions before the E.C.J.
under Treaty Article 169 for failure to timely implement Directive 75/129. Case 91/81, E.C.
Commission v. Italy, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 468; Case 131/84, E.C. Commission v. Italy, [1986] 3
C.M.L.R. 693. Similar action was initiated by the Commission against Belgium. See Case 215/83,
E.C. Commission v. Belgium, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 624. All three cases concluded the respective
Member State had failed to fulfill its obligations under the EEC Treaty.
147. See Bourn, supra note 106, at 230.
148. E.U. Directive 75/129, supra note 8, art. 3.1.
149. Id.
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representatives may send any comments they may have to the competent
public authority."' 50
A similar notification procedure exists under WARN, except the
competent public authority is clearly designated as both the state dislocated
worker unit and the chief elected official of the unit of local government
where the mass layoff or plant closing is to occur." I If more than one unit
of local government exists in the geographic area in which the collective
dismissals occur, the "local government" is that body to which "the
for theyear preceding the year" for which
employer pays the highest taxes
52
the determination is made.
In the United States, as in the European Union, local government and
state dislocated worker units'" (collectively the "competent public
authority") essentially receive the same information as that provided to
trade unions, or where employees are unrepresented, the individual
employees. Under WARN a modified written notice may be provided to
the state dislocated worker unit and local government. However, the
employer is required to maintain complete information "on site and readily
dislocated worker unit and to the unit of general
accessible to the state
154
local government."'
One remedy provided under WARN for lack of notification to public
authorities that is not found in Directive 75/129 is that local government
may bring an action against an employer in their U.S. district court having
venue for civil penalties due to the failure to provide notification.'15 The
penalty shall not exceed $500 per day for each day the employer is in
violation. 56 In one case that has been litigated and settled out of court, a
employees and sued the
county government joined with dislocated
7
notice.'
provide
to
failure
for
employer
Employers under WARN are to provide sixty days notice to their
employees or their union prior to implementing a mass layoff or plant
closing.' 58 Failure can result in a penalty equal to the wages lost by each
effected employee for every day that notice is not given or should have

150. Id. art. 3.2.
151. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
152. Id.§2101(a).
153. While the location within state government of the dislocated worker unit will vary from
state to state, it is consistently that unit of state government which has been designated or created
within the respective state under Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1651.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(2).
154. 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(e).
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3)(West'1994).
156. See id. § 2104(a)(3).
157. See County of Cambria v. Navaco Indus., C.A. No. 93-189J (W.D. Pa. 1994).
158. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(West 1994).
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(c)

equivalent bodies);
the crews of sea-going vessels ....

WARN, like the EU Directive, does not cover state or local
governments or sea-going vessels and encompasses greater exemptions
among employers otherwise covered by its terms. Those exemptions apply
to providing a full sixty-day notice and fall into three categories or
defenses: (1) faltering company exception, (2) unforeseeable business
circumstances, and (3) natural disaster exception.
Each of the three WARN exceptions arguably find a parallel in the
decision of the E.C.J. in Dansk Metalarbe/derforbundi Danmark H v.
Nielsen & Son. 17 3 In Nielsen, the E.C.J. held an employer who has
experienced financial difficulties should not be penalized for lack of
clairvoyant powers to foresee its impending economic demise and
resulting collective dismissals. 74 However, it should be observed the
Directive's 1992 amendment, a direct result of Nielsen, deleted from
Directive 75/129's coverage "terminations of an establishment's activities
where that is the result of a judicial decision.'' 75 In Nielsen, the
undertaking was in a court sanctioned reorganization due to the company's
indebtedness/lack of operating capital.' 76 The union for the undertaking's
employees sought to terminate its members employment with their
employer due to the undertaking's precarious financial condition. 177 The
employer protested the action. 7 The E.C.J. rejected the union's tactic,
arguing in a novel fashion that to sanction such action permitted "workers
the possibility of bringing about [their own] dismissals against the will of
[their] employer and without his being in a position to discharge his
obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the directive. It would lead to a result
which precisely contrary to that sought
by the directive, namely to avoid
79
or reduce collective redundancies."'
Whether unforeseen economic circumstances remain a defense to
liability under Directive 75/129 and its 1992 amendment is unresolved.
The issue has not been addressed by the E.C.J. since Nielsen. Under
WARN, as under the EU Directive, businesses are not required to foresee
the unknown. However, the three WARN exceptions to providing the full
sixty-day notice are strictly construed.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

E.U. Directive 75/129, supra note 8, art. 1.2.
Case 284/83, [1985] E.C.R. 553, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 91(1986).
See id. at 99-100.
Formerly art. 1.2(d) of Directive 75/129 EEC. See Directive 98/59, art:4.4.
[1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 91, 92 (1986).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 99.
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Exceptions for providing a sixty-day notice under WARN are not
absolute; they merely legitimatize the employer providing a shorter notice
period. The Act clearly contemplates affected employees be given "as
much notice as is practicable and at that time (the employer) shall give a
brief statement of the basis for reducing the notification period."' 0
Employer's possessing legitimate reasons for not providing the full
mandatory notice period, yet failing to provide affected employees written
notice outlining the grounds for their entitlement, can lose their right to the
exception)18' Once separation of employment is a foregone conclusion,
notice must be given without delay." 2 The burden of proof remains with
the employer to prove its situation meets one of the three exceptions
provided by the Act." 3
The first exception, the "faltering company" defense, is defined by the
Act as an employer "actively seeking capital or business which, if
obtained, would have enabled the employer to avoid or postpone the
shutdown and employer reasonably and in good faith believed that giving
the notice required would have precluded the employer from obtaining the
needed capital or business."' 'l It should be observed the faltering company
exception "applies to plant closing but not to mass layoffs and should be
narrowly construed."'8 " In order to come under the exception, the employer
must fall within one or more of the following categories:
" Seeking capital or business during the sixty-day notice
period, including but not limited to arranging loans,
issuance of capital generating stock, bonds, or other
internally generated financing, or seeking money, credit,
or business "through any other commercially reasonable
method. The employer must be able to identify specific
''
actions taken to obtain capital or business.""6
" The expectation of additional business or financing must
8 7
be realistic.
* The additional business or financing must have been
sufficient to avoid, postpone, or enable the employer8 8to
maintain the entity "for a reasonable period of time."'
• The employer must have "reasonably and in good faith"
180. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(3) (West 1994).
181. See United Paperworkers v. Alden, 901 F. Supp. 426, 427 (D. Mass. 1995); Alarcon v.
Keller Indus., Inc., 27 F. 3d 386, 387 (9th Cir. 1994).
182. See Jones v. Kayser Roth, 748 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (E.D. Tenn. 1990).
183. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.9.
184. 29 U*S.C. § 2102(b).
185. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a).
186. Id.§ 639.9(a)(1).
187. See id. § 639.9(a)(2).
188. Id. § 639.9(a)(3).
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Under WARN failure to provide proper timely notification to
employees, unions, and communities can result in payment by the
employer of those wages an employee would have earned had the
notification period been followed.2"3 The period of violation for which the
employer will be liable to each of its employees will be the number of days
within which notification should have been given but was not, "up to a
maximum of 60 days." 2" While the employer may deduct from the penalty
"voluntary and unconditional"2 °5 payments made on behalf of the
employee, there is no offset for other earnings received during the
violation period, including but not limited to unemployment insurance
received by the worker or other state benefits. Vacation benefits due an
employee cannot be credited against the penalty, nor may worker
compensation benefits paid or owing a worker as a result of an injury
arising out of or in the course of his or her employment.2 6 Nor may
severance benefits by reason of a collective bargaining agreement be used
to offset the penalty for lack of the notice.20 7 One case has even held
payments received as a WARN penalty do not constitute "wages" for
purposes of state unemployment insurance benefits.20 ' The obvious
message is lack of timely notification by an employer will result in a
penalty in every sense of the word.
It should be appreciated that payments for benefits, such as life and
health insurance made to third parties/trustees on behalf of the employee
are available to employers to offset notification penalties.20 9 Courts are
empowered to exercise their discretion and reduce penalties where "an
employer in violation.., proves that the act or omission was done in good
faith."2 o However, an employer's subjective belief that things will get
better is not sufficient justification to reduce liability and avail the
employer of the good faith defense.2
As a further inducement to discourage lack of compliance, "aggrieved
employees" or their unions may file complaints on their behalf seeking the
notification penalties.21 2 Attorneys fees and costs of litigation may be
awarded to successful litigants.2t3 Punitive damages to discourage future

203. See id. § 2104(a)(l)(A).
204. Id.
205. Id. § 2104(a)(2)(B).
206. See generally USWA v. North Star Steel, 809 F. Supp. 5 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
207. See id.
208. See Capital Castings, Inc. v. Arizona Dep't of Employment Sec., 828 P.2d 781, 784,
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
209. See 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2)(C).
210. See id.§ 2104(a)(4).
211. See Jones, 748 F. Supp. at 1291-92.
212. See 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5).
213. See id. § 2104(a)(6).
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noncompliance by other employers are not available under WARN.2 14
Unlike other labor/employment statutes, such as the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938,215 WARN does not provide the D.O.L. with enforcement
power. All litigation to enforce WARN must be brought by aggrieved
employees or their unions.216 The D.O.L. merely has authority 217 to issue
regulations, as cited throughout this discussion.
I. Deadlinesfor Implementation
WARN was signed by the U.S. President on August 4, 1988, but the
legislation did not become effective until February 6, 1989.218 The
Secretary of Labor was authorized to promulgate prospective regulations
upon the legislation's enactment.21 9
Under Directive 75/129, E.U. Member States were mandated to "bring
into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions needed in
order to comply with this Directive within two years following its
notification. ' 220 The notification occurred at Brussels on February 17,
1975. The Directive's amendment, Directive 92/56 EEC, enjoyed a similar
two-year implementation period. As noted earlier, Directive 75/129 was
not fully implemented within the Community until the United Kingdom
adopted the Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings
(Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations of 1995, "which
came into effect for collective redundancies and transfers taking place on
or after 1 March 1996. ' '22I
III.

THE UNITED KINGDOM'S EXTENDED PERIOD OF
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS TREATY OBLIGATION

TO IMPLEMENT E.U. DIRECTIVE

75/129

The United Kingdom's aversion during the Thatcher/Major years to
enhance or even stabilize trade union involvement in employment
relationships is exemplified by its failure to acknowledge its Treaty
obligations regarding worker information and consultation under Directive

214. See Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., 726 F. Supp. 460, 464-65 (S.D. N.Y. 1989).
215. 29 U.S.C. § 201.
216. See United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.,
116 S. Ct. 1529(1996).
217. See 29 U.S.C. § 2107(a).
218. See WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT OF 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-379, 102 Stat. 895 (codified in 9 U.S.C. § 2101).
219. See id.
220. E. U. Directive 75/129, supra note 8, § IV, art. 6 (deleted in Council Directive 998/59,
which took effect August 1998, art. 9).
221. Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)
(Amendment) Regulations of 1995.
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been given. "9The statute uses the term "a 60-day period" without defining
whether the statute contemplates calendar days or work days.
Unfortunately, the regulations issued by the D.O.L. fail to directly address
this issue. 60 As a result, litigation has occurred that has merely further
clouded the issue.
Only one circuit, the Third Circuit, within the twelve nonspecialized
circuits comprising the U.S. Court of Appeals has adopted the calendar
days interpretation.' 6' Four circuits have adopted the working days
interpretation. 162 A sharp divergence has arisen within the Federal appellate
court system on this aspect of the statute's interpretation.
Proponents of the calendar-day. interpretation, most notably the
Maurice and Jane Sugar Law Center of the National Lawyers Guild, who
have litigated this issue on multiple occasions on behalf of workers made
redundant, contend the calendar-day approach better serves displaced
workers and accurately reflects congressional intent at time of WARN's
passage. Specifically, the Sugar Center argues their interpretation
"involves163 more damages, typically an additional 18 days in a 60-day
period."'
The U.S. Supreme Court in 1994 denied a writ of certiorari in

159.
160.
161.
114 S.Ct.
162.

See id.§ 2104(a).
See 20 C.F.R. § 639.2.
See United Steelworkers v. North Star Steel, 5 F.3d 39,42 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert. denied
1060 (1994).
See Carpenters Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 15 F.3d 1275, 1282 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995); Saxion v. Titan-C Mfg. Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 559 (6th Cir. 1996);
Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Co., 140 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 1998); Bums v. Stone Forest
Indus., 147 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998).
163. LITIGATING THE WARN ACT: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 32. Maurice and Jane Sugar Law
Center For Economic and Social Justice: A Project of the National Lawyers Guild ed., (1996). The

volume, privately published, hosts a plethora of valuable information for lawyers litigating WARN
cases. The Center is located at 645 Griswold, Suite 1800, Detroit, MI 48226, (313) 962-6540.
Additionally the Sugar Center contends:
The calendar day reading is best defended by the purpose of WARN, that is, "to

require advance notification of plant closing and mass layoffs," which would be
subverted under a working day approach. Pursuant to that approach, employers
pay the same amount in damages for violating WARN as they would have paid in

wages for conforming to it, thereby reducing or removing their incentives to
comply. Conversely, a calendar days interpretation would not result in equal
damages; ostensibly, the larger payments required in cases of violations would
provide an incentive towards compliance. The contract suggest that if Congress
meant to require notice and notjust to compensate for its default, the punitive and
deterrent calendar days reading must have been intended.

Id. at 32-33.
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Carpenters Council v. DillardDepartment Stores,164 which sought to
resolve the calendar- versus working-day issue. The continued confusion
on the question encouraged the Sugar Center to seek, unsuccessfully,
review in two recent cases, Breedlove v. EarthgrainsBaking Co. 6 ' and
Burns v. Stone ForestIndustries, Inc.166 The calendar-day interpretation
has been unsuccessfully urged by the D.O.L. in federal circuit courts of
67
appeal.

1

WARN, however, does encourage early compliance by employers with
its notification procedures for individual workers, trade unions, and
competent public authorities. Regulations issued by the D.O.L. approve
incomplete notice "more than 60 days in advance," provided a subsequent
complete notice is given "at least 60 days in advance of a covered
employment action."'168 Likewise, conditional notice may be provided to
the appropriate parties and is dependent "upon the occurrence of an event,
such as the renewal of a major contract, only when the event is definite and
the consequences of its occurrence" will result in a plant closing or mass
layoff.169 Lastly, it should be noted that whether it is a notice to workers,
their union, or competent public authorities, an employer has an obligation
under WARN to provide the best information available at the time notice
is given. 70 Inadequate notice has been equated with no notice by judicial
171
decision in the United States.
G. Exclusions of Coverage
EU Directive 75/129, as noted previously, contains three exclusions to
its coverage to-wit:
(a)

(b)

164.
165.
166.
167.
at 11.
168.
.169.

collective redundancies affected under contracts of
employment concluded for limited periods of time or
for specific tasks except where such redundancies take
place prior to the date of expiry or the completion of
such contracts;
workers employed by public administrative bodies or
by establishments governed by public law (or, in
Member States where this concept is unknown, by

Dillard, 115 S. Ct. at 933.
S. Ct. Docket No. 98-77 (denied Oct. 5, 1998).
S.Ct. Docket No. 98-556 (denied Dec. 7, 1998).
Newsletter ofthe LaborandEmploymentCommittee, NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, Oct. 1998,

20 C.F.R. § 639.7(2).
Id. § 639.7(3).
170. See id. § 639.7(4).
171. See U.E. v. Maxim, Inc., 5 IER Cases 629, 630-31 (D.C. Mass. 1990); Washington v.
Aircap, 831 F. Supp. 1292 (D.S.C. 1993).
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believed giving the notice would have inhibited its ability
to obtain the financing or business or its source would not
do business with a "troubled company."' 89
Notwithstanding the above, an exception is not available to an
undertaking with "access to capital markets or with cash reserves."' 9 The
condition of the operating unit alone is not the deciding factor. The entity
must be viewed on a company-wide basis.' 9 ' Additionally, withholding
notification merely to sell or liquidate a business in a more positive market
setting will not entitle the undertaking coverage under the faltering
company exception.' 92
The second exception, commonly called the unforeseeable business
circumstance defense, is a plant closing or mass layoff "before the
conclusion of the 60-day period if the closing or mass layoff is caused by
business circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable as of the time
that notice would have been required."' 93 The circumstances under this
category must have been reasonably unforeseeable by the employer at the
time the employer would otherwise have been required to provide notice.
The exception has been judicially recognized as an event caused by a
sudden, dramatic or unexpected incident beyond the employer's control.
In one case, the release of nitrogen dioxide, a potentially lethal gas,
causing the shutdown of a plant met the definition. 94 In another case, a
hospital closed its doors suddenly without notice to its employees due to
lack of continued financial support from an eleemosynary foundation. The
foundation was concerned over its continued Internal Revenue Service tax
exempt status by providing funds to the financially troubled hospital.' 95 A
federal district court concluded, while the underpinning for the
foundation's decision may have been legally incorrect, the hospital had no
control over the foundation's decision-making process, and the defense
was available.
The D.O.L. has characterized such unforeseeable circumstances as
including (1) a principal client's sudden and unexpected termination of a
major contract, (2) a strike at a major supplier, (3) an unanticipated and
dramatic major economic downturn, and (4) a government-ordered closing
of an employment site without prior notice. 196 The test for determining

189. Id.§ 639.9(a)(4).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Seeid.
193. See I.U.E. v. Midwest Fasteners, 763 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D.N.J. 1990).
194. See Bradley v. Sequoyah Fuels Corp., 847 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Ok. 1994).
195. See Jurcev v. Central Community Hosp., 7 F.3d 618, 620 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 901 (1994).
196. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b)(1).
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whether the business circumstances qualify for this exception "focuses on
an employer's business judgment."' 97 The D.O.L. Regulations provide that
"[t]he employer must exercise such commercially reasonable business
judgment as would a similarly situated employer in predicting the demands
of its particular market." '
The third and final exception is the "natural disaster" defense, which
the Act defines "as a flood, earthquake or the drought currently ravaging
the farmlands of the United States."' 99 Why the drought "ravaging" the
farms of America in the 1980s was included in the Act can only be
attributed to the political power in the U.S. Congress of the agricultural
business community. The DOL Regulations further quantify the exception
by noting its application only where "an employer (can) ... demonstrate
that its plant closing or mass layoff is a direct result of a natural
disaster."2"
As previously noted, Directive 75/129 contains no "special
circumstances" defense. The United Kingdom has, however, recognized
special circumstances defenses that are narrowly construed and "must be
uncommon or out of the ordinary-a sudden and unexpected, rather than
a predictable disaster .... The fact that dismissals were triggered by the
employer becoming insolvent is not of itself a special circumstance. 22° In
E.C.J. Case C-382-92, which sought implementation of Directive 75/129
in the United Kingdom, this deviation from the directive was not raised by
the Commission. While the Directive does not mention redundancies by
reason of a strike, WARN does and excludes application/coverage "when
permanently replacing a person who is deemed to be an economic
striker. 20 2 Strikers in the United States generally fall into one of two
classifications: economic strikers or unfair labor practice strikers.
H. Statutory Penaltiesfor Failureto Comply
Directive 75/129 is limited to setting minimum standards for
information and consultation in the event of collective redundancies. It
leaves the issue of entitlement for displaced workers to compensatory
redundancy payments to the E.U. Member States. WARN provides for
lost-wage payments for lack of proper notice, an entitlement separate and
apart from unemployment insurance, which is administered by the states
within a federally designed scheme.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. § 639(b)(2).
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(B).
20 C.F.R. § 639.9(c)(2).

201.

SIMON DEAKIN & GILLIAN S. MoRRIS, LABOUR LAW 691 (1995) (footnote omitted); see

also Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, §§ 187(7), 189(6) (Eng.).
202. 29 U.S.C. § 2103(2).
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75/129. Margaret Thatcher's view, upon taking office, of the U.K. trade
union movement was described in pithy fashion in her memoirs as follows:
"We also had to deal with the problem of trade union power, made worse
by successive Labor governments and exploited by the communist and
militants who had risen to key positions within the trade union movement positions they ruthlessly exploited .... 222
Recognizing that worker information and consultation has its E.U.
genesis in the Social Charter, one is not surprised by Baroness Thatcher's
observation:
The Social Charter was quite simply a socialist charterdevised by socialist in the Commission and favored
predominantly by socialist member states. I had been
prepared to go along (with some misgivings) with the
assertion in Council communiques of the importance of the
"social dimension" of the Single Market. But I always
considered that this meant the advantages in terms ofjobs and
living standards which would flow from freer trade.223
A. The Thatcher Years, 1979-1990
The Thatcher electoral victory of May 4, 1979, resulted in a hostile
atmosphere in the United Kingdom to the E.U. goal of employer
information and consultation with workers and their representatives. At
the time Council Directive 75/129 was adopted, the U.K. Industrial
Relations Act 1971 was in limbo, having been repealed in 1974, with its
successor the Employment Protection Act 1975 not yet law. Each of these
pieces of legislation "provided a mechanism for the appointment of
workers' representatives in the event that an employer might refuse to
recognize such representatives. '2 24 The statutory mechanism for
appointment of worker representatives in nonunion settings was repealed
by the Thatcher initiated Employment Protection Act 1980.225
With enactment of the Employment Protection Act 1980, recognition
of worker representatives became dependent on the will of employers. As
recognized by one legal text:

222. MARGARET THATCHER, THE DowNING STREET YEARS 97-98 (1993).
223. Id. at 750-51.
224. Case C-383/92, Re Business Transfers: EC Commission v. United Kingdom, [1995] 1
C.M.L.R. 345, 356 (1995).
225. See id.
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[T]he reach of collective bargaining narrowed considerably
during the 1980's due cumulatively to a reduction in the
proportion of workplaces where trade unions are recognized
for at least some employees (from two-thirds in 1980 to just
over half (53%) in 1990 and in the proportion of employees
covered by collective agreements from 64% in 1984 to 47%
in 1990), a trend which seems likely to have continued during
the first half of the 1990's ....226
Advocate General Walter Van Gerven in Cases C-382/92 and C383/92227 described the situation in the United Kingdom from 1980 to the
mid- 1990s as follows:
[T]he present rules largely deprive Article 6 of Directive
77/187 and Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 75/129 of their
effectiveness. By making recognition of representatives
dependent on the will of employers, the obligations set out in
those articles are undermined ....
There is, however, a huge
difference between leaving Member States free to provide for
workers' representatives in accordance with their own legal
systems and leaving them free not to provide for any such
representatives at all.228
He further stated that "no inference c[ould] be drawn from... Article
1(1)(b) of Directive 75/129 to the effect that worker representation can
' Yet, within the United Kingdom
depend on the consent of employers."229
for nearly two decades, notwithstanding Directive 75/129, worker
representation was dependant upon employer sufferance.
The lack of worker representation and consultation in the United
Kingdom did not arrive initially at the E.C.J. as a result of the lack of
harmonization on directives relating to collective dismissals (75/129) or
acquired rights (77/187). In 1982, the E.C.J. heard an action brought by the
Commission against the United Kingdom for a declaration under Article
169 EEC concerning the inability of a worker in the United Kingdom to
have his or her work judicially declared to be of equal value to another's
in order to receive equal pay for that equal work.23° In that case, the E.C.J.
dealt with Directive 75/117 EEC, which is intended to eliminate all

226. DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 201, at 667.
227. [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 345 (1994).

228. EC Commission v. United Kingdom, I C.M.L.R. at 356.
229. Id. at 357.
230. Case 61/81, Re Equal Pay for Equal Work: EC Commission v. United Kingdom, E.C.R.
2601, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 284 (1982).
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discrimination in worker pay based upon gender.23 ' Under Article 6 of
Directive 75/117, Member States are required to empower an entity of
government within its jurisdiction to decide whether different jobs are of
equal value. 232 The E.C.J. held that an individual has the right to initiate a
claim in a national court, notwithstanding objections from their
employer. 233 "The only way in the United Kingdom in which it was
possible to determine whether two work functions were of equal value was
by means of a job classification system which could be introduced only
with [the] employer's consent. 234 The United Kingdom argued that the
Directive in no way affected national laws and practices. The E.C.J.,
however, stated that it "c[ould not] endorse that view,' 23 ' and swiftly
imposed a remedy by holding that "[t]he Member States must endow an
authority with the requisite jurisdiction to decide whether work has the
same value as other work, after obtaining such information as may be
required. 236
It should be observed the English language version of Directive 75/129
' The
refers not to collective dismissals but to collective "redundancies."237
term "redundancy" in U.K. law is defined in the Redundancy Payments
Act 1965 and is limited in scope. 3 The Directive's definition of collective
redundancies is far more expansive.23 9 When implementing the Directive,
through passage of the Employment Protection Act 1975, the United
Kingdom adopted the 1965 Act's definition of redundancy. 240 Thus, from
1975 forward, the implementation of Directive 75/129 in the United
Kingdom was at odds with the scope of coverage intended by the
Commission. Compounding the error, the courts in the United Kingdom
"drew a distinction between dismissals by reason of redundancy, and
dismissals by reason changes in the work resulting from reorganisation.
The latter were deemed to fall outside the scope of redundancy and hence
did not engage the provisions the UK law introduced to implement the
1975 Directive. 24 '
A third element of contention resulting in lack of implementation of
Directive 75/129 in the United Kingdom arose over the distinction between
the words "contemplating" and "proposing." Under Article 2(1) of

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 299.
EC Commission v. United Kingdom, I C.M.L.R. at 360.
Commission v. United Kingdom, 3 C.M.L.R. at 299.
Id.
See id.
See id.

239. See BRIAN BERCUSSON, EUROPEAN LABOUR LAW 226-27 (1996).

240. See id. at 227.
241. Id. at 228 (footnote omitted).
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Directive 75/129, an employer when "contemplating collective
redundancies... shall begin consultations
with workers' representatives
242
with a view to reaching an agreement.

Sections 188 to 198 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Consolidation) Act 1992 sought to replace Sections 99 to 107 of the
Employment Protection Act 1975 (EPA), the latter being an earlier attempt
to implement Directive 75/129 in the United Kingdom.2 43 The obligation
for consultation in both pieces of legislation did not arise until an employer
was "proposing" to dismiss employees as redundant. 2" The distinction in
scope between contemplating and proposing gave rise to alternative
judicial interpretations. One case favoring a narrow view held as follows:
We cannot read [s 99(8) EPA] as requiring an employer to do
anything about consulting a trade union in respect of its
employees unless and until a proposal to dismiss one or more
of them on the ground of redundancy is at least in the mind of
the employer. When that 2occurs,
the obligation under the
45
statutory provisions arises.

The broader view was argued by the employees' union in another
case, 246 which contended that the court should, if possible, "construe
United Kingdom legislation so as to comply with the United Kingdom's
obligations under an EEC directive. ' 247 Rejecting the trade union position,
the Court, in convoluted fashion, wrote that "the phrase 'an employer
proposing to dismiss as redundant' cannot include one who is merely
thinking about the possibility of redundancies. [One] cannot construe the
word 'proposing' to embrace the full range of possible meaning of the
word 'contemplating' but. . . can construe 'contemplating' in a sense

equivalent to 'proposing.' "248
Nine months later in a case of great national import over the proposed
closing of thirty-one collieries by British Coal Corporation (B.C.C.), the
narrow view was rejected. 249 Three coal mining unions protested the lack
of consultation by B.C.C. and adherence to previously established national

242. EU Directive, supra note 8 art. 2(l).
243. Regina v. British Coal Corp. & The Secretary of State for Trade & Indus., [19931 1
C.M.L.R. 721, 730 (1993).
244. Id.
245. USDAW v. Leancut Bacon, (1981) I.R.L.R. 295, at para. [24].
246. See Re Hartlebury Printers Ltd. & Others, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 704 (1994).
247. Id. at 712.
248. Id. at 713.
249. Regina v. British Coal Corp. & The Secretary of State for Trade & Indus., [1993] 1
C.M.L.R. 721 (1993).
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procedures in the industry.25 Lord Justice Glidewell wrote as follows:
[T]he difference between the wording of the directive and the
wording of section 188 of the Act of 1992 is such that the
section cannot be interpreted as having the same meaning as
the directive.
I say this because in the directive consultation is to begin
as soon as an employer contemplates redundancies, whereas
under the Act it only needs to begin when he proposes to
dismiss as redundant an employee. The verb "proposes" in its
ordinary usage relates to a state of mind which is much more
certain and further along the decision-making process than the
verb "contemplate"; in other words, the directive envisages
consultation at an early stage when the employer is first
envisaging the possibility that he may have to make
employees redundant. Section 188 applies when he has
decided that, whether because he has to close a plant or for
some other reason, it is his intention, however, reluctant, to
" '
make employees redundant.25
Because of the foregoing interpretation and the inability of workers to have
a representative in dismissal settings where their employer had refused to
recognize their right of representation by a trade union, Directive 75/129
had limited impact in the United Kingdom.
With these obvious limitations to Directive 75/129's application in the
United Kingdom, the Commission pursuant to Article 169 E.C. instituted
proceedings against the United Kingdom on November 27, 1989. The
E.C.J. rendered its judgment on June 8, 1994. Once the case reached the
E.C.J., the United Kingdom accepted the proposition that its narrow
definition of redundancy in the 1965 Act when applied to its 1975 Act
' of Directive
"constitute[d] a defective implementation"252
75/129. As for
the ability of an employer to evade consultation with its employees, the
United Kingdom accepted "this has been a shortcoming in its legislation,
and one which has already been put right."2
Notwithstanding its acknowledgment of extreme tardiness in
implementing Directive 75/129, workers in the United Kingdom remained
dispossessed of their E.U. rights during this extended period of
noncompliance. In an article published prior to the E.C.J.'s 1994 judgment,
insolvency professionals in the U.K. were to advise their clients to

250. See id. at 722-23.
251. Id. at 751.
252. Cases C-382/92 and C-383/92, I C.M.L.R. at 371.
253. Id. (arguably by the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act, 1992
(TULRCA)).
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"[clonsider causing the company to withdraw recognition from the trade
union prior to making the redundancies. If this were done before the
proposal to effect redundancies was made, the obligation to consult may
'
not arise."254
The primary focus of the article was on Sections 188 to 189 of the
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, which
mandated consultation by employers with their recognized trade unions.2 "
Under Section 188(6) employers in the course of their consultation were
required to "consider any representations made by the trade union... to
reply to those representations" and if rejected, state why. 256 This statutory
attempt to conform in exceedingly limited fashion to Article 2(1) of
Directive 75/129 in the United Kingdom was deemed by the insolvency
writer as "contentious and highly impracticable. 257
Thus, faced with a U.K. mindset that Directive 75/129 "was not
intended to amend national rules or practices concerning the designation
' the E.C.J. responded by stating the United
of workers' representatives,"258
Kingdom's "point of view cannot be accepted. 2 59 The Court also noted the
ability of an "employer to frustrate the protection provided for workers by
Article 2 and 3 of the directive, must be regarded as contrary to those
articles."
As previously noted, the United Kingdom by including the definition
of "redundancy" from the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 in the
Employment Protection Act 1975 as synonymous to collective dismissals
"failed to give full effect to the directive on this point. ' 260 The United
Kingdom acknowledged this before the E.C.J., with the Court holding the
definition "does not cover all the cases of 'collective redundancy' covered
by the directive. ' 26' Moving to the EPA's failure to require the Directive's
mandated consultation with workers' representatives "with a view to
reaching an agreement," the E.C.J. simply held the EPA did not require an
employer to consult with his employees toward reaching an agreement.262
Lastly, noting the failure to provide sufficient deterrent when "an
employer [failed] to comply with his obligations to consult and inform the
workers' representatives, '263 the United Kingdom conceded "its legislation
254. A. Owen, Collective RedundanciesandInsolvency, INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE 75,
80(1992).
255. See id. at 75.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 76.
258. Cases C-382/92 and C-383/92, I C.M.L.R. at 385.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 387-88.
262. Id. at 388.
263. Id.
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was at variance with Treaty requirements."'
The E.C.J. forcefully
observed Member States have an obligation to see "infringements of
Community law are penalised. '' 26s Accordingly, the Court held that "the
United Kingdom legislation largely deprives that sanction of its practical
effect and its deterrent value." 2 "6
The E.C.J. concluded that the United Kingdom failed to fulfill its
obligations under the directive and under Article 5 [EEC]. 267 A similar
failure of the United Kingdom to effectively implement Directive 77/187
was found to exist in companion Case 382/92 concerning the failure on the
part of the United Kingdom to implement the Acquired Rights Directive.268
Rejecting the suggestion of its Advocate General in Case 382/92,269 but
accepting it in Case 383/92,270 the E.C.J. ordered the United Kingdom to
pay costs in both cases.2 71 With the E.C.J. decision in .1994, the task of
getting the United Kingdom back on course with Directives 75/129 and
77/187 fell upon Thatcher's successor, John Major.
B. The Major Government Response to the
EuropeanCourt of Justice Decision in Case C-383/92
Under the authority of the U.K.'s European Communities Act 1972
(ECA), the Major Government amended Section 188 of the Trade Union
and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA) by issuance
in October 1995 of regulations to implement Directives 75/129 and
77/187. The regulations, The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations
1995, were issued as secondary (as opposed to primary) legislation by the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.
Shortly thereafter, in March 1996, three unions'in the United Kingdom
filed proceedings to challenge the Regulations.272 Without going into great
detail, the Regulations sought to implement Directive 75/129 by requiring
that the dismissal of 20 or more employees by reason of a redundancy
would bring into play worker information and consultation. The applicants
argued the earlier enacted TULRCA required consultation with the
employer recognized trade union over a single job loss. Therefore, the

264. Id.
265. Id. at 389.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 372.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 373.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 390.
272. R. v. Secretary of State for Trade & Indus., ex parte UNISON, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 459
(1997) [hereinafter UNISON].
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Secretary's action in raising the consultation criteria from one to twenty or
more employees over a period of ninety days or less was intravires "under
the powers conferred upon him by Section 2(2), read with Section 2(4) of
the European Communities Act 1972... ,"2"3 The High Court (Queen's
Bench Division) upheld the Secretary's authority, citing the ability of a
Member State under Directive 75/129 to select from alternative methods
for defining collective redundancies under Article 1.1.274 The Regulations
implemented one of the two approved methods contained within the
directive. The High Court in R. v. Secretaryof Statefor Trade & Industry
ex parte UNISON discussed the statutory underpinnings of the European
Communities Act 1972 that legitimatize the Secretary of State's ability to
initiate secondary legislation. 75 Given the "very general and wide
powers ' 276 possessed by the Secretary of State by reason of the E.C.A., one
cannot help but conclude Directive 75/129 languished so long in the
United Kingdom due to the Thatcher and Major aversion to worker
consultation by worker not employer designated representatives.
Facing the issue of worker designated representation and the selection
thereof, 1995 Regulations, Section 3(2), mandate consultation shall occur
with such representatives "in good time" "with a view to reaching an
agreement," as required by Directive 75/129.277 The representatives shall
be "employee representatives elected by them" or representatives of the
trade union recognized by the employer, "as the employer chooses. 27 8 The
three unions in UNISON argued the process allows the potential for
employers to "cherry-pick" representatives of its choice and not that of the
employees. 279 Also, the unions raised the spectre of employers casting
groups of employees in antagonistic postures, fearing the possibility that
employees negotiating over their dismissal will entice the employer to
select another group of employees be designated redundant with whom

273.
274.
275.
pursuant

Id.at 467.
Id.at 468.
Id at 471. The European Communities Act 1972 empowers the Secretary of State,
to Section 2(2) to make provision by regulations:
(a) for the purpose of implementing any Community obligation of the United
Kingdom or enabling any such obligation to be implemented... etc.
(b) for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or related to any such
obligation, or rights . .. etc. European Communities Act 1972, European
Communities Act, § 2(2).

276.
277.
278.
279.

UNISON, I C.M.L.R. at 471.
Id.at 478.
Id.
Id. at 474.
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there has been no consultation. 80
The unions' concerns over the representative selection process were
rejected on the premise that the Directive is no more specific on this
subject than the Regulations."' The High Court adopted the argument of
the Treasury Solicitor, S. Richards, that Directive 75/129 was intended to
achieve "partial harmonisation" and "not intended to establish a uniform
level of protection throughout the Community on the basis of common
criteria. 28 2 Utilizing this same line of thinking, the High Court also
rejected the unions' arguments that the regulations failed to provide
sufficient detail for the employee electoral process.283
C. ProgressToward Worker Information
and Consultation Under Tony Blair
Following the election of Tony Blair in May 1997, the Labour
Government in February 1998 issued a document entitled "Public
Consultation Document on, Employees' Information and Consultation
Rights on Transfersof UndertakingsandCollective Redundancies."2 " The
document deemed that the 1995 Regulations were "an inadequate response
to the ECJ's judgments, and for introducing unnecessary and unwelcome
confusion and complexity in the legislation, causing uncertainty for
employers and insecurity for employees."2 5 The arguments for change
appear to reflect, in part, the arguments of the three trade unions in
UNISON.
In May 1998, the President of the Board of Trade presented to
Parliament a White Paper entitled "Fairnessat Work,"2" 6 which set forth
the Blair Government's proposals on collective redundancies and other
work place issues. In its foreword, Prime Minister Blair states that he seeks
a "culture of fairness and opportunity at work so that Britain can harness
the talents of all our people."' However, he warns there can be no "return
to the laws of the past."2 8 Keeping in step with the E.U. argument that its
social dimension is based, in part, upon competitiveness, the U.K. White
Paper calls for "a culture in all businesses.., in which fairness is second

280. Id.
281. Id. at 479.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 480.
284. COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCIES REPORT, supra note 144.
285. Id.
286. (U.K.) Departmentof Trade & Industry, The Stationery Office, Fairness at Work, (May
1998) <http://www.dti.gov.U.K.>[hereinafter Fairnessat Work].
287. Id. at foreward.
288. Id. at foreward.
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nature and underpins competitiveness. 289
Chapter Four, Collective Rights, states that "trade unions can be a force
for fair treatment, and a means of driving towards innovation and
partnerships. ' 29° The Blair Government "believes every employee should
be free to decide to join a trade union .... [E]qually every employee
should be free not to join .... There will be no return to the closed
shop."29 '
Legislation is promised "to provide for representation and recognition
where a majority of the relevant workforce wants it."1292 A detailed legal
scheme is proposed whereby employees can select union representation,
but only after efforts by the social partners (management/labor) to achieve
a voluntary agreement prove unsuccessful in bargaining units of twenty or
more employees. 29' A proposal to make unlawful discrimination on the
"grounds of trade union membership, non-membership or activities" is
promised.294
The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection
of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 1995, the Major Government's
reaction to the E.C.J. decision of 1994, are noted as being "widely
criticised and the (Blair) Government intends to amend them. '295
Prime Minister's Blair White Paper appears committed to implement
all aspects of Directive 75/129, as codified by the E.U. Council on July 20,
1998 and now designated as Council Directive 98/59.296 However, while
acknowledging its desire to achieve agreement on a European Company
Statute, Blair's agenda "is not persuaded of the need for a directive on
information and consultation in companies operating only at a national
level. '297 This position puts the United Kingdom at odds with the proposal
of E.U. Social Affairs Commissioner Padraig Flynn "to bolster the rights
of workers in firms operating in only one EU country." 298 A similar
position to that of the United Kingdom is urged by UNICE, the European
employers' federation.299
While Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven sits in the House of Lords, and
John Major, M.P., awaits elevation to this diminishing body which enjoys

289. Id. at para. [1.8].
290. Id. at para. [4.7].
291. Id. at para. [4.8].
292. Id. at para. [4.11]..
293. Id. at paras. [4.17-.18], annex 1.
294. Id. at para. [4.25].
295. Id. at para. [4.32].
296. See E.C. Directive 75/129, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
297. Fairnessat Work, supra note 252, at para. [4.5].
298. UK. Government Rallies Opposition to Worker Consultation Proposals,EUROPEAN
VOICE, Oct. 29 - Nov. 4, 1998, at 7.
299. Id.
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occasional episodes of rebellion, the issue of implementation of Directive
98/59 appears to be resolved in the United Kingdom. Further
implementation of expanding concepts of worker information and
consultation remain potentially contentious between the European Union
and the United Kingdom.
IV.

RESOLUTION OF WORKER INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION ISSUES
WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION Is DEPENDENT UPON THE
DEGREE OF FEDERALISM THE COMMUNITY WILL ADOPT

While our discussion has focused primarily upon collective
redundancies, the thread of worker information and consultation runs
through the topic. As the Commission has recently stated, "[i]nformation
and consultation of employees has been a major pre-occupation of the
European Community's for many years." 3°°
Directive 98/59 is linked by necessity with Directives 77/187 and 94/45
EEC; each of which are grounded on the proposition that "information and
consultation are factors for productivity as they contribute to the creation
of a highly skilled and committed workforce."' O' While acknowledging
that most EU Member States have a statutory or negotiated legal
framework aimed at ensuring information and consultation, the
Commission has observed, that in many Member States "social rights are
not always respected in practice."302 Thus, according to the Commission,
"[EU] Community law is fragmented... [and] the current Community
provisions do not contain adequate provisions for sanctioning decisions
which are taken in contravention of workers' rights to information and
consultation."3 3 To overcome this lack of compliance, the Commission
proposes another directive to achieve its elusive goal, arguing its proposal
recognizes the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity to gain
palatability among the Member States.

300. Proposalfora CouncilDirective Establishinga GeneralFrameworkfor Informingand
Consulting Employees in the European Community, Nov. 13, 1998, available at
<http:europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/dat/1998/en-598PC0612.html>.
301. Id. at II, The Basis for the Proposal; see Green Paper, Partnershipfor a New
Organization at Work, adopted by E.U. Commission, Apr., 1997, available in
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgO5/soc-diallsocia/greenen.htm> [hereinafter Green Paper].
302. Green Paper, supranote 302.
303. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

43

FLORIDA JOURNAL Ol'1NTERATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 1

(Vol. 12

A. Why Was the European Union Unable to Achieve
Community- Wide Implementation of Worker
Information and Consultationin a Timely Manner?
The Commission's fundamental problem is its inability to enforce its
goals upon E.U. Member States, once enacted by the Council. The Treaty
structurally and willfully denies the Community such power. The
European Union, for this American, seems similar to the United States
between November 15, 1777 and September 17, 1787, during its decade
under the Articles of Confederation. That decade in which America's War
of Independence was waged against King George III was also one marked
by national structural government failure and frustration. The Constitution
of the United States arose out of that experience. Under the Articles of
Confederation, as currently in the European Union, each state retained "its
sovereignty, freedom and independence." 3 A "firm league of
friendship 3 °5 was created with "free ingress and regress to and from any
other state"30 6 with corresponding privileges of trade and commerce.30 7
Confederation did not work. A central government with power to force
states to comply with national laws was necessary. In the 1700's the United
States was a homogenous community sharing common boundaries,
traditions, religion and social structure. The European Union currently
enjoys none of those attributes. However, the E.U. Member States share
a common desire to harmonize a diverse economy with areas of
insignificant growth, areas lacking potential for growth, and currently
consistent high unemployment.
A 1997 Commission Green Paper noted employment in the Member
States increased in 15 of the 20 years since 1977 to 16 million newjobs. °s
However, 8 million jobs in the E.U. were lost during this period of
economic downturn, leaving a net growth of only 8 million while the
community's working age population during the same period increased by
28 million.30 9
David Currie, Professor of Economics at the London Business School,
has wisely observed that "the relevant debate concerns the form of
federation that we want, not whether we want one. The choice for Europe

304. Articles of Confederation, art. II.
305. Id. art. III.
306. Id. art. IV.
307. Id. art. IV.
308. Green Paper, supra note 302.
309. Id. Current unemployment in the European Union stands at 9.8%. Europe Delays
Decisions on Admitting Ex-Communist Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1998, at 11. In the United
States, unemployment was at 4.6% for October 1998. Issue No. 1000, CCHLabor Law Reports No.
637, Dec. 9, 1998, at 5.
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is not between a federation and a non-federation, but rather the degree of
federalism."'3 10 The EMU, according to Bernard Connolly, former
Commission economist, "is a way of producing political union via single
currency."' The lack of a monetary union within the "several States"
undermined the Articles of Confederation.
Those who wish to prevent within the E.U. the creation of a
"superstate," in the Jean Monnet vision, will find solace in former U.K.
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd's comments:
We are not talking about a European federal union which
delegates powers to its component parts. We are dealing with
nation states which have successively pooled into a European
centre their authority over certain sectors of policy in order to
secure for their citizens benefits which the individual state
cannot by itself achieve, but have retained the rest of that
authority for themselves.312
Worker consultation and information, whether it be directed toward
collective redundancies, job security following a business transfer, or in
corporate/undertaking governance, is dependent in its level of
implementation and acceptance upon the degree of political federation
within the European Union. While the United Kingdom is ending close to
two decades of isolation from E.U. social policy-making, the current
government will not necessarily move toward "closer political integration
with European Union, or a substantial move towards the European social
model."3 3' Worker information and consultation will continue to evade
resolution until the overriding issue of the degree of political federation
within the EU is resolved. Proposed new directives by the Commission on
information and consultation will merely give rise to contentious debate
until Member States decide on the "eventual balance between the nation
state and the institutions of the EU, the conflict will simmer."314
B. Where Are Workers Best Protected When Unexpected Job Loss
Occurs? In the European Union or the United States?
Where then is the redundant worker best protected? In the European
Union under Directive 98/59 or in the United States pursuant to the
WARN Act? Are we comparing apples and oranges? Probably. The

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Special Report: Does EMU Need Political Union?, PROSPECT, June 1998, at 64.
Here It Comes, But Will It Work?, PROSPECT, Dec. 1997, at 37.
D. Hurd, Endstation Europa, PROSPECT, Aug./Sept. 1998, at 15.
Britain, Out of Harmony Again, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1998, at 59.
Hurd, supra note 273, at 14.
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Annex315 to the Commission's latest proposed directive details by chart,
Table 1, national provisions within Member States of the European Union
on information and consultation. The document demonstrates redundant
workers in Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark,
France, Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Spain enjoy greater protection than
similarly displaced workers in Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and the
United Kingdom.316
Consultation under WARN does not exist. However, the statute
provides uniform application, benefits, and penalties whether the
undertaking is in Maine, Montana, or Mississippi. Employers in the United
States face identical impediments and obligations that impact upon their
competitiveness, unlike E.U. employers.-However, displaced European
workers, on the whole but not individually, enjoy greater protection and
benefits than redundant workers in the United States. That point is clear.
The U.S. federal system after 200 years of political evolution provides a
level playing field. The glowing goals of the Commission constitute half
promises. For example, redundant workers in County Mayo, Ireland, when
compared to other more advantageously placed workers in the European
Union. The inequity in implementation of Directive 75/129 in the
European Union served to place employers at a competitive disadvantage
with competitors in Member States less inclined to implement the spirit of
the E.U.'s social dimension, notwithstanding the E.U. goal of leveling, for
competitive reasons, the social cost among its Member States.
V. CONCLUSION

Inequality of treatment of people generated by geographic residency in
' will not
"an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe"317
be resolved
by new Community directives where acceptance is left to Member States
whose past track record has been that of delay or non-implementation.
A U.S. college history text has observed that the Articles of
Confederation "did not possess a republican form of government, that is,
' The European
a government based on peoples as constituent power."318
Union, like the Articles, is not based on the constituent power of the
peoples of Europe, but rather independent states who have retained their
primary attributes of national sovereignty. The European Union of 1998
could be described, as the Articles of Confederation in that U.S. history

315. Proposal,supra note 264.
316. Id.
317. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Preface, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C224)
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992).
318. ALFRED HINSEY KELLY ET AL., I THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 77 (7th ed. 1991).
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text, as being "concerned with relations among states rather than with
proper balance between power and liberty in the constitutional
structure."'3 19 The European Monetary Union is a major effort to overcome
one aspect of national identity, monetary policy exercised through a
national currency.
While the euro's future cannot be safely predicted, its introduction as
a common currency in eleven of the fifteen E.U. Member States
"symbolizes a colossal achievement. 320 It is. not, however, a political
statement but rather "a mere prosaic economic tool. '32' While motivated
by a desire in the E.U. to challenge the dollar's supremacy in the world
financial system, it lacks the political structure and will that stands behind
the U.S. dollar. This lack of a political base behind the euro was well
described by Martin Walker, European editor of the Guardian,when he
wrote that "the EU will continue 3to22 play the curious double role of
economic giant and political dwarf.
For as the headline introducing Walker's piece so clearly observes,
"until the euro acquires a political voice, Europe will continue to play a
support role to the [United States] in world affairs. 3 23 A position not
desired by the Brussels-based E.U. leadership. An d la carte approach to
the EC Treaty, as exemplified by the United Kingdom and Italy's tardy
implementation of worker information and consultation, frustrates the goal
of equality of treatment for citizens within the respective E.U. Member
States.
European Unionist may object to the E.U.'s comparison to a failed
period of governmental structure in U.S. history, however, it is too obvious
to be overlooked or disregarded. In discussing the Articles of
Confederation, a subject of Her Majesty, born of a British father of nobility
and an American mother of wealth, Sir Winston S. Churchill, accurately
observed the motivation behind the scraping of the Articles and the
adoption of the Constitution was necessitated by the realization that an
"efficient government must be established before disaster overtook
' 324
America."
Disaster is not in the immediate future of the European Union.
However, frustration among the people of Europe is possible. The scope
of the European Union sought by those at the Commission in Brussels
must come in harmony with the parameters of the Community as

319. Id., see also 1. Buruma, NationalSuccess, PROSPECT, Dec. 1998, at 36.
320. Shiny, Prosperous 'Euroland'Has Some Cracks in Facade,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1999,
at 1.

321. Id.
322. M. Walker, Taming the Dollar, PROSPECT, Jan. 1999, at 25.
323. Id. at 22.
324.

3 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES 258 (1957).
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envisaged by the national leadership of its Member States. As the Treaty
states, no action shall be taken by the Community which goes "beyond
what is necessary to achieve the objectives ofthis Treaty."32' 5 The problems
in implementing worker information and consultation, including Directive
98/59 and the proposed directive of November 13, 1998, highlights the
underlying conflict between the Community's goal and the "objective" of
the Treaty as envisaged by E.U. Brussels-based leadership and that of the
leadership of some but not all the Member States. A uniform resolution of
the degree of political federation that Member States desire to achieve is
necessary to conclusively determine the direction and implementation of
worker information and consultation. In addition a host of other looming
issues, such as tax harmonization, are well on their way to becoming
contentious and divisive to the European Union's continued development,
and they too seek an identical resolution. The success to date of the
European Union in achieving a community-wide social dimension has
been due in no small part as a result of the success of the E.C.J. to impose
upon the Community a Rule of Law and to develop a body of Community
Law. That process however must be constrained by the Treaty and the
scope of the Court's jurisdiction. The E.C.J. is limited in its activism by
the level of acceptance of its decisions. Those decisions must find their
grounding in the Treaty or in its rational reading. "Pushing the envelope"
on the social dimension of the Community requires a uniformity of
purpose among the Member States, as evidenced by the tardy and weak
implementation of worker information and consultation.
In the not too distant future, the European Community will face the
inherent conflict grounded in the Treaty's adherence to confederation and
the desire of a significant number of Member States to uniformly
implement the European Union's social dimension within a context more
compatible to a political federation then an economic confederation. Is
there room in the Treaty for both viewpoints? Does the Treaty need to be
renegotiated to resolve this conflict? For the continued success of the
European Union the questions await a uniform response.

325. EC Treaty, art. 3b.
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